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An Examination of International Environmental
Racism Through The Lens of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes
ROZELIA S. PARK'
INTRODUCTION
Increasing accusations of environmental racism in the domestic context
have led to allegations of environmental racism in the global context by
activists, academics, and leaders ofdeveloping nations. Claims of international
environmental racism arise when a government or corporation pursues policies
that disparately impact minorities.' Conscious intent to continue racial
subordination is not necessary:2 "any action that has negative predictable
consequences for racial minorities can be an act of environmental racism ....
It is only important that the practice in question perpetuates the dominance of
one race over another."
3
Domestic charges of racism in the United States are echoed in the language
used to describe the maquiladora program when corporations from an
"economically-superior and predominantly white" United States use Mexico as
a "dumping ground for toxin-producing industries."'  International
environmental racism can be seen as "a practice in which the predictable
* J.D. /M.P.A, 1999, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; AB, 1993, University of
Chicago. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor David Fidler for his insightful comments and
editing skills, and to her family and friends for their support. Special thanks also to the editorial staff of the
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies for their hard work.
1. Xavier Carlos Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Environmental Racism,
34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357, 367-68 (1993).
2. Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv. 839,840
(1992).
3. Vasquez, supra note I, at 368-69.
4. The maquiladora program "reftnds customs duties on raw materials or intermediate goods imported
into Mexico for use in the production of goods that are to be immediately exported." Id at 360-61.
5. Id at 369.
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distributional impact of a decision to pollute contributes to the structural racial
subordination that exists in the world today. ' 6
A major issue in international environmental racism is the phenomenon of
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Governments and corporations,
usually from developed nations, create hazardous waste in their country as a by-
product of manufacturing and pay developing countries to dispose of this
waste.' The shipment of hazardous waste from developed to developing
countries is environmental racism on an international scale.'
The most often cited reason why developed countries export their hazardous
waste to developing countries is that the disposal of wastes is much more
strictly regulated and, thus, more expensive in developed countries than in
developing countries.9 Strict regulations in one country make it less expensive
and more simple to ship it to another country, usually in the developing world,
in order to dispose of the waste. Countries that agree to take the waste usually
have inadequate waste disposal facilities, non-existent liability schemes, and
insufficient enforcement mechanisms and personnel."0 In contrast to this often
cited reason, environmental racism holds that developed countries are more
willing to use developing countries as a dumping ground not because of cost or
convenience but because of race and poverty."
This note will consider charges of international environmental racism by
examining environmental racism theories from the domestic context and
applying them to the phenomenon of transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes from developed to developing countries. Part I isolates four
6. Id. Vasquez explains that: "[T]he United States practices international environmental racism when
the actions of its government or corporations work to maintain the racial subordination and domination of the
United States over Mexico." Id. Vasquez charges that the U.S. government commits environmental racism by
"failing to clean-up pollution along the border and by not requiring stricter standards for U.S. owned
maquiladora industries." Id. at 374.
7. Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to CONFRONTINGENviRoN ENTALRACiSM: VOICES FROM
THEGAssRooTs 3,4-5 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); BILL MOYERS, CENTERFOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,
GLOBAL DUMPINGGROUND: THEINTERNATIONALTRAFFIC IN HAzARDousWASTE 104-05 (1990) [hereinafter
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING].
8. Hugh J. Marbury, Note, Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation ofEnvironmental
Racism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 291 (1995).
9. Id; Mutombo Mpanya, The Dumping of Toxic Waste in African Countries: A Case of Poverty and
Racism, in RACE ANDTHE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 204,209 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai
eds., 1992).
10. Mpanya, supra note 9, at 211-12. In Koko, Nigeria, an unknowing individual stored hundreds of
rusting, leaking drums of toxic PCBs in an extremely unsafe manner on his property, endangering himself, his
family, and the townspeople. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, supra note 7, at 1-2.
11. One study reported that there is a "low level of appreciation for Africa and African people among
Western business-people." Mpanya, supra note 9, at 212.
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characteristics of environmental racism. Part II turns to the less-developed
international literature and examines the historical patterns of hazardous waste
movement from developed to developing countries. It also describes and applies
the analogous elements on the international level that correspond to the domestic
factors previously discussed. Part III describes the international legal
framework before the Basel and Bamako conventions and then presents a brief
comparison of the two conventions. Finally, Part IV concludes that the
characteristics of environmental racism do not adequately explain the current
situation in the context of hazardous waste movement across international
borders because of the development of the two conventions limiting the
transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes. It also discusses how national
sovereignty issues played a different role than in most international agreements,
and how sovereignty and racial unity created solidarity and helped developing
nations to garner more power for themselves.
I. THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
A. The Four Characteristics of Environmental Racism2
There are four characteristics shared by American communities in which
hazardous waste sites have been located. A study commissioned by the United
Church of Christ 3 concluded that itwas "'virtually impossible' that the nation's
commercial hazardous waste facilities are distributed disproportionately in
12. Before I begin to summarize the results of these well-known studies, I should say that my objective
is merely to present the general thinking on environmental racism. There are critiques ofthe studies I mention.
Professor Vicki Been argues that the research does not support the claim that racism and classism in the siting
process itself is the cause of the disproportionate burden that poor and minority communities bear in hosting
locally undesirable land uses (LULUs). She argues that events subsequent to siting may lead to the current
disproportion in the distribution of LULUs. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?., 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1385 (1994). Michel
Gelobter has also examined the statistical variables one must consider when studying environmental racism and
hazardous waste siting policies. Michel Gelobter, Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination, "in
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 9, at 64, 73-76.
Summarizing these critiques is beyond the scope of this paper. My goal in presenting the conclusions of
these studies is to show that race is a good indicator of where hazardous waste facilities are sited, and not to do
a comprehensive analysis of the environmental racism literature.
13. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES: ANATIONALREPORTONTHERACIALANDSOPCIO-ECONOMICCHARACTERISTICSOFCOMMUNITIESwrrH
HAZARDOUS WASTE SrrEs (1987) [hereinafter UCCC Study]. This was the first national study of environmental
racism to take income into account along with race.
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minority communities merely by chance; therefore in all likelihood underlying
factors related to race play a role in the location of these facilities."' 4 These
underlying factors include: 1) availability of cheap land; 2) lack of opposition
to the siting of the facility due to lack of political resources and clout; 3)
inability to "walk with their feet" or lack of mobility resulting from poverty and
housing discrimination; and 4) poverty. 5 The characteristics contribute to
communities' vulnerability to unfair sitings of waste and polluting industries
and, thus, their disproportionate exposure to environmental risk. 6
Industry and government actively seek out these characteristics when they
make siting decisions. 7 "The siting process commences when a corporation or
governmental body begins a search for a proper location for a new facility. The
'proper location' is determined by a number of considerations ... [including]
the physical requirements of the facility itself and ... the costs of siting,
constructing and operating the facility."'"
First, cheap land is a factor because most corporations or governmental
bodies are "economically rational actors" trying to minimize their short-term
and long-term costs.'9 Money is saved if the facility owner does not have to
negotiate with communities because the communities are unable to effectively
resist.'0
14. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in
the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 921, 922 (1992) (emphasis added).
15. Id. The first three of these characteristics were isolated by Mohai and Bryant. The fourth is one that
I added since all the thorough studies of environmental racism account for income levels. The same basic
characteristics were listed by Godsil and Freeman in their article on community economic development. The
characteristics they listed were as follows: (1) state ofeconomic depression and/or high unemployment; (2) lack
of effective political power; and (3) availability of inexpensive undeveloped or underdeveloped land zoned
industrial or otherwise suitable for uses associated with environmental degradation. Rachel D. Godsil & James
S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and
Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMp. LEGAL IssuEs 25, 26-27 (1994).
16. Godsil & Freeman, supra note 15, at 26.
17. See note 24 and accompanying text. "Several commentators argue that corporations have deliberately
or unconsciously concluded that race, average income, average education and other socio-economic
characteristics can and should be considered in selecting asuitable site." James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil,
The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 547, 553 (1994).
18. Godsil & Freeman, supra note 15, at 551.
19. Id. at 551 n.17.
20. Id. at 552.
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Second, political power is important because it is necessary for a
community to be able to marshall resources for effective protest of a siting
decision.2 Lawmakers and administrators of government agencies are "more
responsive to the demands of constituents who possess the greatest political
influence."' Middle to upper class communities have more resources, such as
time, money, contacts, and knowledge of the political system, 23 than poor and
minority communities to mount effective protests when their communities are
sited for hazardous waste facilities. Naturally, corporations do not want to deal
with opposition and, therefore, look to the paths of least resistance by siting
their facilities in neighborhoods that are least likely to protest.
Third, lack of mobility is important because it means that minorities, often
with high rates of poverty, do not have the option of buying their way out of
their communities.24 They cannot afford to move to communities where they
would be out of danger from hazardous waste facilities. The result is that
facilities are often sited in poor minority communities rather than poor white
communities. Thus, people of color are stuck in communities in which they are
doomed to suffer environmental dangers.
Fourth, poverty is at the foundation of most of the three other
characteristics of environmental racism. All of the hazardous waste siting
studies have shown that income is an important indicator of siting decisions. In
most of the studies that accounted for race, investigators found that income was
second only to race in explaining the outcomes. Low income, and low
educational level interact with the lack of resources, which results in low
political representation and low participation in the decisionmaking process.
Environmental racism does not lend itself to being picked apart and forced
into a well-defined theoretical framework. To do so would deny the subtleties
and insidiousness of racism. For the purposes of this analysis, however, I will
examine each factor individually on the international level.
21. Id.
22. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 810 (1992).
23. Mohai & Bryant, supra note 14, at 924.
24. Vicki Been, Market Dynamics and the Siting of LULUs: Questions to Raise in the Classroom
About Existing Research, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1069, 1072-73 (1994).
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B. Environmental Racism = Institutional Racism?
The United Church of Christ study noted that the mechanisms that allow the
practice of environmental racism to exist, such as zoning and redlining,
"represent institutionalized forms of racism." 5 One legal scholar stressed that
the "racism" in "environmental racism" should be emphasized.6 He argues that
of the four characteristics listed, the racist aspect of environmental racism is
often overlooked since none of these characteristics contains any specifically
racist aspects. It is precisely the hidden nature of racism that makes it difficult
to locate and change policies in order to put an end to discriminatory
outcomes.' It is more helpful to look at the outcomes rather than the intent
behind the policies because the initial racist intent often no longer exists.
Outcome considerations are the opposite of intent considerations. A lawsuit
is one obvious solution to an environmental racism claim, but an equal
protection violation requires proof of discriminatory intent-nearly an
impossible standard-and claims of environmental racism under the equal
protection clause have not succeeded in any U.S. court.'
The Reverend Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Executive Director of the United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, coined the phrase
"environmental racism." He has described it as:
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in
environmental policy-making. It is racial discrimination in the
enforcement of regulations and laws. It is racial discrimination
in the deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic
waste disposal and the siting of polluting industries. It is
racial discrimination in the official sanctioning of the life-
threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in communities
25. Mohai & Bryant, supra note 14, at 922.
26. See Tones, supra note 2, at 845.
27. For more on the subtleties of racism see Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Needfor Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLoGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Peggy C. Davis, Law
as Microaggression, 98 YALE L. J. 1559 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REv. 317 (1987).
28. See Cole, supra note 27 (arguing that litigation to remedy claims of environmental racism
disempowers people of color by forcing them into a court system controlled by their business and government
opponents, and by trusting strategic decisions to legal and scientific "experts" who tend to be paternalistic). See
also Godsil & Freeman, supra note 15,at30-31. Activists advocate that more political and community-based
methods, rather than legal ones, should be taken to fight environmental racism. Id. at 33-35.
664 [Vol. 5:659
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of color. And, it is racial discrimination in the history of
excluding people of color from the mainstream environmental
groups, decision-making boards, commission, and regulatory
bodies.29
This definition emphasizes the institutional aspect of environmental racism.
Similarly, Professor Robert Bullard argues that the conditions that lead to the
"creation and maintenance of the black ghetto and the drift toward two'separate
and unequal"' societies still exist.3" Racism has been institutionalized in the
policies of government and decision making bodies that hold power in our
society. Policies reflect the attitudes ofpolicymakers. Although the individuals
who hold racist attitudes come and go, racist beliefs are reflected in policies that
far outlast individuals. These policies, emanating from government agencies
and other institutions, effectively continue to isolate and marginalize people and
communities of color.3 Not only that, but government policies and corporate
policies interact to reinforce each other. Industrial production is influenced by
government policy.32 Thus, local governments in conjunction with urban-based
corporations reinforce racially discriminatory practices.33
Some use the language of domination and subordination to define
environmental racism: environmental racism "contributes to the structure of
racial subordination and domination that has similarly marked many of our
public policies in this country." '34 Gerald Torres, Professor Bullard, and
Reverend Chavis share the idea that institutionalized racism is the means by
which environmental racism is practiced.
29. Chavis, supra note 7, at 3.
30. Robert Bullard, Residential Segregation and Urban Quality of Life, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 76, 77 (Bunyan Bryant ed. 1995).
31. Freeman and Godsil argue that even agencies, which have a more impartial and neutral view and act
as checks on corporate or governmental decisionmaking, are not immune to political influence. See Godsil &
Freeman, supra note 15, at 554-55. See also Lazarus, supra note 22, at 807.
32. Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement,
in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 15, 18.
33. Bullard, Residential Segregation and Quality of Life, supra note 30, at 81. Bullard characterizes
it in this manner: "IE]conomic development and environmental policies flow from forces of production and are
often dominated and subsidized by state actors." Id
34. Torres, supra note 2, at 840 (emphasis added).
1998]
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Housing policies are a good indicator of how conditions arise to encourage
hazardous waste siting. Through redlining," discriminatory zoning policies,36
lending practices, housing and real estate practices, and urban industrial
development, people of color have been and continue to be ghettoized. Bullard
describes this type of discriminatory housing policy as "[a]partheid-type
housing,"" which results in "limited mobility, reduced neighborhood options,
decreased environmental choices, and diminished job opportunities for African-
Americans."38 Housing discrimination, in turn, also contributes to the "physical
decay of inner-city neighborhoods" and denies African-American communities
a "basic source of wealth and investment specifically through home
ownership." '39 It is no coincidence that the most polluted urban neighborhoods
are those with a "crumbling infrastructure, deteriorating housing, inadequate
public transport, chronic unemployment, high poverty, and an overloaded health
care system."'
C. International Literature
International literature on environmental racism is very limited. There is,
however, a great deal of information on the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes. Greenpeace has estimated that "industrialized nations
produce approximately 300 million tons of hazardous waSte per year."" The
EPA has estimated that the United States exported approximately 160,000 tons
35. "A 1991 report by the Federal Reserve Board found that African-Americans were rejected for home
loans more than twice as often as Anglos." Bullard, Residential Segregation and Quality of Life, supra note
30, at 78.
36. Bullard argues that:
Zoning is probably the most widely applied mechanism to regulate urban land use in the
United States .... Zoning ordinances, deed restrictions, and other land-use mechanisms
have been widely used as a NIMBY ["Not in My Back Yard"] tool, operating through
exclusionary practices ..... Exclusionary zoning is "one of the most subtle forms of
using government authority and power to foster and perpetuate discriminatory practices.
Id. at 81-82 (citations omitted).
37.Id. at80.
38. Id.
39.Id. at77.
40. Id.
41. Daniel Jaffe, Note, The International Effort to Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste: The Basel and Bamako Conventions, 2 ILSA J. INT'L L., Spring 1995, at 123, 125 (1995) (quoting
Teresa A. Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The Growing Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REv. 889, 892 (1991)).
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of hazardous waste per year.42 This amounts to one percent of the waste
generated in the United States." "By 1983, a cargo of hazardous waste 'crossed
a national frontier more than once every five minutes, 24 hours a day, 365 days
a year' within Western Europe and North America, according to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development."" Although less
than one percent ofthe United States' hazardous waste was shipped to the Third
World, the volume of U.S. waste shipments have "shot up from 30 notices of
shipments in 1980 to more than 400 in 1986 .... the number of Third World
destinations has increased each year."4 Increased waste production has
important implications for waste disposal in producer states, which has
ramifications for waste disposal policies of every nation.
1. Hazardous Waste Movementfrom Developed to Developing Countries
Increased public opposition to hazardous waste siting, scarcity of disposal
facilities, and stricter environmental rules lead to increased disposal costs.
Thus, developed nations are looking for easier and less costly means of
disposing of their waste.' Therefore, corporations follow the "path of least
resistance", which means that corporations export their waste overseas to
countries with less stringent environmental standards and lower disposal
prices.47 By exporting their waste, "corporations can avoid the tougher
measures necessary to cut down on the use of harmful chemicals and to reduce
waste production at home."4 Until recently there was little incentive to slow
42. Keith WhiteGANNrNEwsSERvIcE, July 12, 1989,available in LEXIS,NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File
43. Jaffe, supra note 41, at 892.
44. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, supra note 7, at 10.
45. Andrew Porterfield, Dumping a Love Canal on the Third World?: American Firms Are Exporting
Hazardous Wastes to Poor Nations Where the Risks Aren't Fully Understood, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1988, at
49 available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
46. KATHANAKummER INITRNATONAL MANAGrmaIroF HAZARDOUS WASrE 6(1995). "[A]ccording
to a study carried out in the late 1980s, the average disposal costs for one ton of hazardous wastes in Africa was
between US $2.50 and US $50, with equivalent costs in industrialized nations ranging from US $100 to US
$2,000." Id. at 6-7.
47. Id. at6.
48. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, supra note 7, at 104-05. Estimates of the amount of waste
exported vary, but it seems clear that a lot of waste is exported from advanced nations each year.
Greenpeace says that in 1992 alone, Western Europe and the EC has [sic] shipped toxic wastes to Brazil,
Albania, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia and II other developing countries. The group estimates that these
waste exports amounted to more than 74,000 tons, but warned that this figure represents only the "first wave"
of a flood of global waste dumping. Environment: Fears Erpressed About Third World Becoming Waste
Dump, INT'L. PRESS SERVCE, Nov. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. Cf. "[A]
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waste production and none at all to discontinue shipping hazardous waste to
other countries.
Toxic wastes find their way from the developed world to the developing
world because environmental regulations are less stringent or nonexistent in
developing countries. 9 Some argue that "[a]t most a fifth of all toxic waste
exchanges take place between developed and developing countries ...
However, imports into the Third World are potentially the most dangerous
because of a general lack of experience of handling and disposal.""0 Developing
countries do have environmental regulations and sometimes very good ones."
The problem is that they are not enforced. 2 Increasingly stringent regulations
in developed nations also contribute to hazardous waste disposal in developing
countries.
In 1989, in Africa, waste disposal costs were about forty dollars per ton.
In contrast, the cost was four to twenty-five times this amount in Europe and in
the United States, twelve to thirty-six times greater.5 3 The effect, however, is
the same: cheaper costs,54 less bureaucratic red tape, and no local opposition
to the dumping in developing nations.
recent survey by the Taiwan Institute for Economic Research ... found that at least 230,000 tons oftoxic waste
was imported into Taiwan from advanced countries between 1989 and 1992." Taiwan Seeking Hazardous
Waste Treatment Cooperation, CENT. NEws AGENCY, July 21, 1994, available in LExIS, NEws Library,
ARCNWS File.
49. Marbury, supra note 8, at 291.
50. Maria Elena Hurtado & Alan McGregor, The Shame of Nations: Toxic Waste Dumping in the Third
World, S. MAG., June 1989, at 77.
51. "'Green' laws are often just as popular in the legislatures of Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia
as they are in the West. But often the laws are not as well enforced." Steve Coil, Free Market Intensifies Waste
Problem: Rich Nations Dumping on Poorer Ones, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1994, at A1.
52. "Inspections by health and safety agencies [in most Third World countries]-if they exist-are rare
because of long travel distances and limited personnel and funds." Joseph LaDou, The Export of Environmental
Responsibility, 49 ARCHIVEs ENvTL HEALTH 6,7 (1994), available in LEXIS, NEWS, Library, ARCNWS
File.
53. Edwin Unsworth, Environment Ministers Push Action to Control Hazardous Waste, J. CoM., Oct.
5, 1989, at 8B.
54. Disposal costs can be substantially lower in developing countries than in the U.S.
It costs them from $250 to $350 per ton to dispose of wastes in the U.S. under the new
[Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] regulations. Some developing companies
[sic] will accept wastes for $40 per ton. Few ofthese countries have sophisticated laws
or technical systems or the infrastructure to handle these wastes.
Nathanial Sheppard, Jr., West Shipping Waste Woes to Third World, CHi. TRIB., July 11, 1988, at 1, available
in, LEXIS, News Library, ARCNEWS File (quoting Wendy Grieder from the E.P.A.'s Office on International
Activities).
668 [Vol. 5:659
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The people of the Third World have historically had even less control over
the movement of these hazardous wastes than do communities of color in the
United States. In the same way that domestic facility owners offer financial
incentives to communities, multinational corporations that want to get rid of
their hazardous wastes pay huge amounts of money to the governments of
developing countries in order to export waste to the country. In addition,
developing nations do not have the administrative capacity nor the technological
expertise necessary to properly dispose of hazardous wastes." Furthermore, the
technology and funds transfer necessary to aid developing nations is
inadequate. 6 Until the developing nations increase their knowledge about
environmental and public health, developed nations must be aware of their
responsibility to prevent hazardous waste dumping in developing countries.
Developed nations have been responsible for tragic events regarding
hazardous waste dumping in developing countries. Several incidents have
attracted international attention to covert, illegal, and immoral hazardous waste
dumping in developing countries. The odyssey of a cargo ship called the Khian
Sea is an infamous example. Because the original port refused to let the Khian
Sea dock, this cargo ship, carrying tons of toxic incinerator ash generated by the
City of Philadelphia, spent nearly two years wandering the high seas in search
of a port in which to unload its toxic cargo. In 1988, the ship finally docked in
Singapore, empty. Although there are many theories about what happened to
the ash, no one, including the ship's crew and captain will confess to where the
ash was finally dumped, although it is unlikely that the ash was dumped at sea.5
Countries' refusals to accept waste for disposal and the secrecy of the wastes'
final destinations reveal the extent to which hazardous waste dumping is viewed
with disfavor.
55. Jaffe, supra note 41, at 125. Representative Jim Florio, a Democrat from New Jersey, compared
waste to "water running downhill" which will "invariably be disposed of along the path of least resistance and
least expense." Richard M. Hopen, Message to the Third World, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRW., Jan. 23, 1985, at
B7.
56. See John Ntambirweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution of an International
Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 905, 912, 918 (1991). Ntambirweki argues that
technology transfer from North to South is an essential part of the new international economic order. Id. at 918.
57. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, supra note 7, at 1. However, sources later revealed that
Guinea agreed to take the ash.
1998]
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Researchers have also documented incidents in which toxic waste was
mislabeled as humanitarian aid."' Even when drums were plastered with skull
and crossbones labels, people exposed were not warned or educated about the
potential harmful effects of the chemicals contained in the drums.59 One
reporter writes: "Some waste comes disguised as charity," and tells of
"supposed medical charity shipped from Europe, Australia and the United
States" to the "devastated Polish coal mining region of Katowice," which turned
out to be "soiled Western hospital wastes and expired medicines that are then
costly to dispose of under Polish environmental law. ' "6
Proponents of the racism theory argue that developed nations have policies
that reflect their desire to dump wastes in the Third World in order to keep the
First World beautiful. This returns to the notion that the developing world must
internalize the externalities from which the rest of the world benefits.6 As
landfill space becomes more precious, developed nations experience the Not In
My Back Yard (NIMBY) syndrome just as U.S. communities have. Often,
nations care little about whether the importing countries have the ability to
dispose of the waste in an environmentally sound manner. Consequently, while
developed countries claim that poor nations are being adequately compensated
for disposing of developed nations' waste, wealthy nations know that the lack
of disposal technology and environmental enforcement measures present a great
danger to the land and the people of these countries.
2. Possible Explanations for Shipping Hazardous Waste to Developing
Countries
a. Racism
Occasionally, explanations for this type of hazardous waste movement use
the language of racism. For instance, the suggestion continues to arise that a
form of racism causes developed nations to dump in Africa. A Third World
research group called CETIM (Centre Europe-Tiers Monde) reports that there
is a "low level of appreciation for Africa and African people among Western
58. See id. at 43-44.
59. See id. at 1-2.
60. Coil, supra note 51, at A26.
61. Mpanya, supra note 9, at 210-13. Mpanya argues that "U.S. and E.C. export policies do not make
enough provisions for liability to third parties" and that "[b]oth rely on... overburdened customs officials for
enforcement." Id. at 212.
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business people."'6 Wendy Grieder, international affairs specialist at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), observed that early negotiations for
the regulation of transboundary hazardous waste shipments "have already
become a racism issue, a North-South issue." '
Leaders of African countries have realized the harm of accepting these
hazardous waste shipments. Starting in the late 1980s, African leaders began
to call for an end to "toxic terrorism." In 1988, the Organization of African
Unity signed a resolution declaring toxic waste dumping a "crime against Africa
and the African people."6 One month later, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) passed a resolution calling for stiff penalties upon
parties that dump toxic wastes.' "The penalty in Nigeria for anyone convicted
of illegal dumping is life imprisonment."67 Daniel Arap Moi, President of
Kenya, called dumping "garbage imperialism."" Morifing Kone, Minister of
Environment of the Republic of Mali, said that First World waste exports were
"morally reprehensible and criminal act[s]."" These calls for moral
accountability blew the veil off secretive dumping.
Some argue that the U.S. export of hazardous waste to the Third World is
merely an extension of the racist U.S. policy of selecting communities of color
for hazardous waste sites." Thus, waste export is motivated by the same
factors that fuel charges of domestic environmental racism. Corporations
choose developing countries for toxic waste siting for the same reasons that
corporations in the United States locate their sites in communities of color."
Rev. Benjamin Chavis states that "the international waste and pollution
practices of U.S.-based corporations reflect the U.S. domestic policy of
62. Mpanya, supra note 9, at 212. Mpanya states that "Africa is perceived of as a continent of immense
jungles, populated by naive people who are guided by a corrupt and unintelligent leadership." Id.
63. Joel Millman, Exporting Hazardous Waste, 92 TECH. REv. (M.I.T. Alumni Ass'n), April 1989, at
6, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
64. From 1980 to 1986, there were three known incidents of illegal dumping in Africa. In 1988-89, this
number increased more than ten-fold. Mpanya, supra note 9, at 206.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 210.
67. Frank Nowikowski, Not in My Backyard: Third World Is No Longer Content to Be a Cheap
Dumping Ground for PCBs, S. MAO., Dec. 1990, at 118.
68. Marbury, supra note 8, at 268 n.124.
69. Id.
70. Marbury states that "the problem of selecting waste sites in the United States is a microcosm of the
international issues raised by hazardous waste exportation." Id. at 254.
71. Id.
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targeting low-income, disenfranchised communities of color."72 Governments
of developing countries are lured into accepting shipments of hazardous waste
with money to build facilities such as railways and hospitals.73 This is similar
to "the pattern of targeted dumping on communities of color in the U.S."74
Undeniably, regulations in the United States and in other developed
countries are more stringent than those in developing countries. For example,
the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) 5 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)76 all but encourage companies to dispose of hazardous waste
abroad. RCRA, for instance, has a specific provision that allows companies to
ship their waste abroad." The statute requires that several criteria must be
satisfied before hazardous waste can be exported: the shipment must conform
to an international agreement between the United States and the receiving
country or the exporter must notify the EPA of the types and quantities of waste
exported, and the receiving country must consent to accept the shipment.
According to Wendy Grieder of the EPA, the requests for permits to export
waste act as a "credit card" which allows U.S. companies to dispose of waste
in countries with lax standards.78 Under the statute, the EPA is "under no
obligation to check that the receiving country can manage the waste in an
environmental [sic] safe manner. Even if it knows the disposal facilities are
unsafe, the EPA has no authority to prohibit the shipments."79  Under
CERCLA, the United States or U.S. corporations are no longer liable for
72. Chavis, supra note 7, at 5. See also Dana Alston & Nicole Brown, Global Threats to People of
Color, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 179.
Marbury states that poor and developing nations are "targets" of hazardous waste exporting "because disposal
in these nations is less expensive as a result of less stringent, or non-existent, environmental regulations."
Marbury, supra note 8, at 291.
73. Alston & Brown, supra note 72, at 185.
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1997).
76. Id. §§ 6901-92k.
77. Id. § 6938. Before RCRA was passed in 1985, there were no requirements that a U.S. corporation
get the express consent of the receiving country or even that it apprize the U.S. EPA of plans to ixport waste.
Richard M. Hopen, Message to the Third World, SAN DIEGOUNIoN-TRIB., Jan. 23, 1985, at B7, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
78. Douglas Jehl, Bush to Seek Curbs on Hazardous Waste Exports to Third World, L.A. TIMES,
Mar.1 1, 1989, at 21.
79. United States: Bid to Restrict Hazardous Waste Exports, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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hazardous waste once it leaves U.S. territory.' Recent case law has held that
in some instances, procedural provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the
National Environmental Protection Act can apply extraterritorially."
The EPA never insists, however, that it has its finger on all the hazardous
waste disposal activity in the country. It is extremely difficult to catch
violators: "The EPA does not know whether it is controlling 90 percent of the
existing waste or 10 percent. Likewise, it does not know if it is controlling the
waste that are most hazardous."' 2 Wendy Grieder has stated that, "[o]nce [the
hazardous waste shipment] gets [to its dump site in a developing country], we
don't know what happens to it."' 3 Even the United States does not have the
personnel or the expertise to effectively regulate growing hazardous waste
exports: "Customs lacks the EPA's expertise in analyzing wastes, and the EPA
lacks the personnel to patrol docks and border stations."'
Internalization of the externalities of hazardous waste disposal is another
explanation of the movement of hazardous waste from developed to developing
nations. Some commentators ask whether developing countries shoulder the
burden of living near and with hazardous waste in the same way that
communities of color pay the costs of hosting hazardous waste sites while the
rest of society benefits. 5 Communities of color are willing to host hazardous
waste facilities in exchange for compensation such asjobs. On the international
level, developing countries deeply in debt are enticed to take in and process
hazardous waste in order to make money. 6
80. Marbury, supra note 8, at 259.
81. See Stanley W. Spracker & Ethan S. Naftalin, Applying Procedural Requirements of U.S.
Environmental Laws to Foreign Ventures: A Growing Challenge to Business, 25 INT'L LAw 1043 (1991).
82. Porterfield, supra note 45, at 49.
83. Id.
84. Id. "Even if the EPA had the people, on-site tests are often inaccurate .... 'Most courts won't even
take the case based on those kinds of tests.'" Id.
85. Marbury, supra note 8, at 291.
86. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 32, at 23.
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b. Economic Reasons
An alternative explanation for the movement of hazardous waste from
developed to developing countries is the economic explanation. "The
information system costs of recording and reporting compliance costs have
declined, and compliance with some environmental regulations has become more
expensive, more specific, and more time-consuming."87 Naturally, corporations
and governments look to other ways to cheaply dispose of hazardous waste. Jan
Huismans of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) says
"published figures point to nearly one million tons of hazardous waste exports
from Western Europe to Eastern Europe each year."8
Movements of waste between racially similar regions (such as movements
of waste from Western Europe to Eastern Europe) are less likely to be
motivated by racism than are transfers of waste between racially different
regions.89 A possible explanation of the hazardous waste trade in Eastern
European and developing countries is the enthusiasm of newly liberated ex-
communist and developing economies to rejoin global trade after being closed
for many years."
Cases of illegal export from countries of one race to a country of the same
or similar race have been well documented: a 1992 scandal involving shipments
from Germany to France; pesticides banned in Germany, shipped to Albania
and Romania without consent;9' Japan illegally exporting wastes to developing
countries in Southeast Asia (primarily to Indonesia); and Singapore illegally
dumping toxic waste in Malaysia and Indonesia.' These cases tend to show
that economics, not race, is the primary factor in the movement of waste. The
87. Christopher H. Stinson, Environmental Regulations and the Costs of Compliance, TEX. Bus. REV.,
Dec. 1, 1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, News, ARCNWS File.
88. Burton Bollag, Hazardous Waste is a Foreign Matter, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 7, 1988, at 45,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
89. With such waste transfers, "[t]he pressure is mainly financial .... [T]oday, the cost of disposing of
hazardous industrial and mining waste can range as high as several thousand dollars per ton.... Shipping such
material abroad often is much cheaper." Coil, supra note 51, at A26.
90. Id.
91. ELL LOUKA, OVERCOMING NATIONAL BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL WASTE TRADE: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF HAzARDous AND RADIOACTIVE WASTES 105 (1994).
92. Id. at 106-07.
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economic explanation seems to be a plausible reason for some ofthis hazardous
waste trade activity."
In the following section, I apply the four characteristics of environmental
racism to the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The
characteristics of the domestic phenomenon do not have analogies on the
international level in all cases.
C. Application of the Four Characteristics of Domestic Environmental
Racism on the International Level
1. Cheap Land
Cheap land is certainly available on the international level in the sense that
costs of disposal are so much lower in developing nations. All siting
decisionmakers attempt to lower costs, which make disposal abroad attractive.
In the domestic context, cheap land is the result of discriminatory housing
policies that ghettoize minority populations and drive down the price of land.
On the international level, lower environmental standards, lack of technology,
and lack of institutional structure combine to make regulations in Third World
countries much less stringent than in developed countries. Less strict
regulations or unenforced regulations mean less money spent on waste disposal.
Therefore, the characteristic of cheap land does seem to have a counterpart on
the international level.
93. Global developments may lead to more waste transfers:
For waste managers and traders, the sudden opening of Eastern Europe and the rapid
rise of Asian economies present new vistas of opportunity, both in helping the
developing countries process their own waste and in finding places to dispose of foreign
refuse. The U.S. Commerce Department is leading delegations of environmental
entrepreneurs across the former East Bloc. In Asia, "they've really hit a takeoff stage,
and that translates into an industry for us."
Coil, supra note 51, at A26 (quoting Edwin G. Falkman).
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2. Lack of Political Power
Third World countries traditionally have been characterized as poor and
politically weak. They do not have a voice in the international environmental
negotiations, sometimes because they have little to say about environmental
protection issues and sometimes because their concerns are extremely different,
and therefore, ignored by developed nations. In the same way that poor
minority communities in the United States often have a low average educational
level and few resources with which to organize to oppose hazardous waste sites,
Third World countries suffer from similar ailments:
It is economic growth that has allowed developed countries to
make advances in the eradication of mass poverty, ignorance,
disease and as such to give high priority to environmental
consideration. Mankind has legitimate needs that are material,
aesthetic and spiritual. A country that has not yet reached
minimum satisfactory levels in the supply of essentials is not
in a position to divert considerable resources to environmental
protection. 9'
African countries cannot be expected to place as much emphasis as developed
nations on environmental protection when so many more basic needs are not
fulfilled.
Even if they did have concerns regarding environmental issues, they might
not have a forum in which to voice them. For all issues of international
cooperation, especially for environmental issues, developing nations have little
power in the agenda-setting process.95 This is due, in part, to the sovereignty
issues that arise when an agenda item is being articulated: "[N]ational priorities
generally prevent consideration of the issue in a global fashion, and make it
difficult for developing nations to force an equitable solution."' For example,
a European country concerned with air pollution from its own factories might
lobby all countries to pay into an international fund to counteract effects of acid
rain caused by air pollution. An African country that has no money to pay into
94. Ntambirweki, supra note 56, at 906.
95. C. Russell H. Shearer, International Environmental Law Colloquium: International Environmental
Law and Development in Developing Nations: Agenda Setting, Articulation, and Institutional Participation,
7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 391,415-16 (1994).
96.Id at 416.
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such a fund, and which is responsible for only a small amount of air pollution
would not receive the kind of aid they need despite the fact that their economy
is hard-hit by the effects of acid rain. A nation with capital has power in the
agenda-setting process. This same nation has the power to stymy a developing
nation's environmental awareness and growth.
However, in some situations, countries have found a way to make an end
run around this dilemma. For instance, in the context of transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes, developing nations in Africa have managed to
band together to put their concerns on the international agenda. These states
have not only managed to draw the attention of developed nations, but also have
achieved radical changes in an existing treaty (the Basel Convention) to reflect
some of their concerns.
Furthermore, three international examples also indicate that developing
nations can band together in order to put their concerns on the international
agenda. This shows that they can muster more political resources than was
previously thought and that despite a lack of wealth, the developing nations are
still concerned about the environment and public health. First, the Rio
Declaration, the document that resulted from the Earth Summit,97 reflects
developing nations' concerns about development. Second, the existence ofthe
Bamako Convention98 speaks to the ability ofthe Organization of African Unity
(OAU) nations, which includes some of the poorest nations in the world, to form
a cohesive position to ban a potentially lucrative trade for the sake of
environmental and public health. Third, the amendment of the Basel
Convention to include Decision II/ 129 is a tribute to the ability of the OAU and
the G-77 nations to affect an important treaty provision, despite initial
97. The United Nations Committee on the Environment and Development (UNCED) held a conference
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992. The main document that resulted from the conference is called the
"Rio Declaration" and is a statement of general principles and obligations, but is not binding. Ileana Porras,
The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for International Cooperation, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 20,21
(Philippe Sands ed., 1994)[hereinafter Porras, Rio Declaration].
98. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamako Convention) was adopted by the Pan-African
Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development in Bamako (Mali) on January 30, 1991. KUMMER,
supra note 46, at 100. See also Bamako Convention on the Ban of The Import Into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, openedfor signature Jan.
29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991).
99. Conference Decision 11/12, March 25, 1994. This amendment was formally adopted at the Third
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention in Geneva, September 18-22, 1995.
Decisions Adopted by the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, U.N.
Environment Programme, UNEP/CHW.3/35 (1995).
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opposition from the United States and several EU nations." The participation
of the developing world in the leadership of the Third Conference to the Parties
also shows that the developing nations have power and resources to bring to the
international context.'0 ' These developments in the policies of hazardous waste
movement belie the seeming lack of political power of developing countries.
The lack of political power in the domestic context does not seem to have a
counterpart on the international level.
3. Lack of Mobility
Third World countries do not have the choice of escaping'the cycle of
poverty and powerlessness in which they find themselves. The developed world,
in having control over the international agenda, naturally places the most
emphasis on First World problems."° Thus, Third World problems are often
overlooked and continue to persist. Because developing nations lack political
power and capital, they have difficulty putting their concerns on the
international agenda, and their problems are never fully addressed by the
international community. This is the cycle of poverty and powerlessness of the
Third World.
On the other hand, the Third World countries have seen great success in
drafting the Bamako Convention and forcing states to amend the Basel
Convention. Although the OAU nations may not be able to change their status
as Third World countries, they can argue that they have made the deliberate
choice to get out of the hazardous waste trade. This may be harmful to them
in terms of economic growth. However, their decision to promote
environmental health and safety by not disposing of another country's
hazardous waste for money might be seen as sacrificing development for the
sake of environmental safety. Third World leaders may have made this choice
consciously because they see the poor health of the public as a cost of low
environmental standards and non-existent enforcement. The gains in
development they might see by building numerous hazardous waste disposal
sites are outweighed by the corresponding harm to public health. The country
or government would then pay the cost of medicine and food for the ailing
100. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 45.
101. Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundray Movement of Hazardous Wasts and their Disposal (visited April 15, 1998)
<http://www.unep.ch/basel/sbclcop/cop3-a.htm>.
102. Shearer, International Law Colloquium, supra note 95, at 415-16.
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populations as well as a loss of productivity. This characteristic does not have
a strong counterpart on the international level.
4. Income/Poverty
Poverty is a major issue that will continue to dominate the Third World
agenda. Lack of capital in Third World countries impedes development and
progress in environmental awareness and standards. °3 Because Third World
countries are often deep in debt, they are more vulnerable to offers of money
and other incentives to dispose of hazardous waste. This factor was the driving
force of the hazardous waste trade to the Third World. 104
In conclusion, the assumed lack of resources, mobility, and money has not
prevented developing nations from achieving great change in international
regulation of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Thus, the
characteristics of "lack of political power" and "lack of mobility" do seem to
be strong indicators that environmental racism does not exist on the
international level, at least with respect to the movement of hazardous wastes.
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM THEORY TO
THE TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
A. International Legal Framework
1. General Principles of Customary International Law s
Several principles dominate the operation of international law. First, the
doctrine of sovereignty holds that each state exercises exclusive jurisdiction
103. Id. at 397-98.
104. It will probably continue to be a major force in Asia, where the Asian countries have not expressed
as strong a dedication to the environment. They have not banded together and drafted a convention to ban the
import of hazardous wastes like the nations ofthe OAU. We can conclude that Asian countries seem to be more
willing than the OAU nations to trade off some environmental safety for an infusion of capital.
105. Customary international law is defined as general and consistent state practice supported by opinio
juris. Charles Allen, Civilian Starvation andReliefDuringArmedConflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law,
19 GA. J. INT'L &COMP. L. 1, 77.
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within its territory. 'I In the environmental context, this means that a state has
exclusive control over the precious resources located in its territory. That state
has complete control over the use or exploitation of that resource and no other
nation may interfere. 07 Thus, any state can refuse a shipment of hazardous
waste into its territory or require explicit permission before hazardous waste
passes through its territory.
0
On the other hand, the doctrine of abuse of rights recognizes the exclusive
territorial jurisdiction of the polluting state, but subordinates its sovereignty to
a superior rule of international law which forbids sovereignty to be exercised in
an abusive manner."° Abuse can consist of the arbitrary exercise of the right
such as the absence of an acceptable motivation for actions when the activity
prejudices another state."0 It can also result from acts whose benefits are
negligible when compared to the consequences produced in the other state."'
"The 'receiving' state has the same range of exclusive territorial competences
as does the polluting state.""' "[I]t is not obliged to accept deterioration of its
environment due to acts taking place on the territory of other states. This right
is no less absolute than that of the polluting state to utilize its own territory."' 13
However, no rule of customary international law [CIL] states that nations
may not work together to find the most efficient and mutually beneficial way to
exploit a resource. Thus, the principle of cooperation requires that all countries
work together on an equal footing."4 Cooperation encourages bilateral and
multilateral agreements to share natural resources.
Further, in the process of transfrontier movement of some of these
resources, carelessness or lack of foresight could result in dangerous mishaps.
The duty to notify of emergency situations holds that "states should immediately
inform other states likely to be affected of any sudden situation or event which
106. ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 119 (1991).
107. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 20. Kummer expresses concern regarding the dangers of foreign
hazardous wastes and the implications for the sovereignty of nations, "especially where there is an economic
and regulatory imbalance between the states involved." Id. at 33.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 120.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 121.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 131.
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could cause harm to their environment and provide that state with all pertinent
information."' "s
Related to the duty to notify is the duty to inform, or the principle of prior
information on projects which could cause transfrontier pollution,"' which has
also been included in several treaties and non-binding agreements. This
principle is tricky, since it is not well-settled when a state must provide such
information. An unfortunate lack of timeliness could easily result in serious
environmental harm.
This principle is not to be confused with prior informed consent, which is
emerging as a rule of customary international law." 7 But customary
international law does oblige "the source state to negotiate in good faith with the
state affected by the harmful activity."' Prior informed consent requires that
a state give express consent to movements of hazardous waste within its
territories, "based on information provided to it by the perpetrating state.""''9
Finally, the duty to consult often accompanies the duty to inform. 2 The
obligation to enter into consultation signifies that the state which is the potential
polluter must be willing to discuss the information with the potential victim
state, which may make observations concerning the pollution.'
These principles have been articulated time and time again in both binding
and nonbinding international law documents." Repetition in this way is part
of the means by which these principles come to be accepted as rules of
customary international law.
115. Id. at 132.
116. Id. at 138.
117. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 24. Kiss calls it a "fundamental principle"of international
environmental law, and seems to stop short ofcalling it a rule ofcustomary international law. Kiss& SHELTON,
supra note 106, at 129.
118. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 20.
119. Id. at 24.
120. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 139.
121. Id.
122. See e.g. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 217. The Cairo Guidelines were elaborated by a UNEP
working group and set out major principles of hazardous waste management in general terms. "As a non-
binding legal instrument, they are primarily designed to assist governments in the development and
implementation of their national management policies for hazardous wastes." Id.
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2. State Responsibility
State responsibility is the notion in international law that a state is
responsible for the damages caused by any activity it pursues or permits' that
violates an international obligation. It is the flip side of state sovereignty.
While sovereignty allows a state to exploit its resources in accordance with its
national policies, state responsibility requires that states be held accountable for
the consequences of those exploitations. Thus, every breach of international
law gives rise to an obligation to make reparations. State responsibility usually
concerns "the treatment of aliens and their property."'2 However, in the
environmental context, it holds that "states may be held liable to private parties
or other states for pollution that causes demonstrable damage to persons
or property."'2 s
The notion of state responsibility for environmental harm may first have
been articulated in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 6 (which is
nonbinding), and has since been included in other international texts, like
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 2 as well
as in other, binding instruments." Many legal scholars argue that Principle
21 is now generally recognized as a rule of customary international law and is
included in section 601 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. 29
123. "[A state] is also responsible for such acts carried out by private operators acting within its area of
jurisdiction or under its control, if the state has breached its obligation to control or prevent such acts." Id. at
217.
124. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 348.
125. Id.
126. Principle 21 states: "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within theirjurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
KUMMER, supra note 46, at 17.
127. The Rio Declaration was adopted by the UN Commission on the Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 15 /S/Rev. 1(1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992).
128. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 349.
129. Id. at 215. "Responsibility" is an objective standard, in which "due diligence", an obligation of
conduct, is imposed. Id. at 215.
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Principle 21 considers potential "victim states, affirming the duty of states
'to ensure' that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states."3 ' The principle holds that states
are required to prevent or abate transboundary pollution that actually cause
substantial harm. It also holds that states are required to prevent or abate
activities that entail a significant risk of causing such harm.' Finally,
Principle 21 is based on the obligations which states assume toward the
international community.' Thus, the duty to not cause damage to the
environment exists not only toward other states, but also toward the 'areas
beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction': the high seas and the airspace above
them, the deep seabed, outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, and
Antarctica."'3
However, Professor Bodansky points out that the second part of Principle
21 is not well-supported by regularities in state behavior (and is thus, not a rule
of customary international law), and that "transboundary pollution seems much
more the rule than the exception in interstate relations."'' His argument carries
much weight in the context of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes,
since there are several documented incidents of illegal shipments of hazardous
wastes across national borders to states clearly incapable of handling and safely
disposing of toxic material. Despite the prevalence of principles stated in
various declarations and treaties prohibiting transfrontier pollution, the practice
of illegal movement of hazardous wastes, although not extremely well-
documented, was enough to raise international awareness of the problem. I
address the argument that transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is not
a rule of customary international law below.
130. Id. at 129.
131. CENTRE FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1985) [hereinafter CENTRE].
132. Id. After the Stockholm Conference, Professor Kummer argues, nations seemed to work toward a
more "holistic" approach to preserving the environment and the earth as a whole: "Pollution came to be seen
as a form ofharm to the environment as such, and the idea of a collective responsibility ofthe world community
to protect the environment from such harm began to evolve." KUMMER, supra note 46, at 32-33.
133. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 130.
134. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND.
J. GLOBAL LE.AL STUD. 105, 11i (1995).
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3. The "Trail Smelter" Arbitration
The principle of state responsibility was explicitly applied to transfrontier
pollution in the TrailSmelter Arbitration decision. The tribunal stated in dicta
that:
Under the principles of international law .... no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.' 35
In addition to generally outlawing transboundary pollution (duty not to cause
"substantial harm" 6), the Trail Smelter Tribunal asserted a general duty on the
part of a state to protect other states from injurious acts by individuals within
its jurisdiction, whether or not the harmful activity was caused by the state's
activities. The arbitration panel also "elaborated a framework for the future.
in recognizing the necessity of further cooperation between the interested
states.' 37
The customary international law prior to the Basel Convention was
apparently fairly well-developed, however, very few activities were actually
prohibited by it.' States have the obligation of due diligence under customary
law, but this vague standard is only defined to a limited extent in treaties and
non-binding guidelines. 39 Furthermore, these standards apply only to the
135. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941), cited in
KUMMER, supra note 46, at 17. "In the Trail Smelter arbitration, a specially appointed arbitral tribunal held
Canada responsible for damages caused to property in the United States by a privately owned smelting plant
in British Columbia.... In its final decision, the tribunal required that the smelter refrain from causing any
future pollution." Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment:
A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between Canada and the United
States, 22 B. C. ENvTL. Alt. L. REv 447,451 (1995).
136. CENTRE, supra note 131, at 95.
137. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 125. "In requiring regulation, the judgment identifies what is
now seen as a general requirement of environmental law: the rules adopted should be flexible and should be
adapted according to the evolution of the situation and knowledge of it." Id.
138. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 18.
139. Id. at 19.
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particular activity or situation described by the treaty.'" Existing treaty law has
not been forward-looking. On the other hand, the Basel Convention is the first
treaty to offer the possibility of a comprehensive global regime to regulate
movement of hazardous wastes.'4
4. Treaty Law
Before the Basel Convention, several non-binding international rules
established safety standards and uniform procedures for international transport
of dangerous substances.4 2 However, they addressed substances other than
hazardous waste and adherence was left to the discretion of states. 43 Transport
of dangerous materials was addressed, but not the rights and obligations of
nations with respect to waste shipments.'" Furthermore, virtually no treaty law
existed prior to the Basel Convention regarding the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste but dealt instead with transfrontier pollution. 5 However,
the evolution of international environmental law has led to the concern for the
environment beyond national boundaries. One example is Principle 6 of the
Stockholm Declaration, which established a general duty to protect the
environment from the ill effects of dangerous substances. Principle 7 applies
this to the marine environment in particular.'" These duties were incorporated
into Articles 192-94 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force November 16, 1994."" Furthermore,
these treaties represent a piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, approach to the
hazardous waste cycle. 48
[Treaties] contribute to the regulation of the issue [of
hazardous waste movement] insofar as they directly or
140. Id.
141. Id. at 29.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 28.
144. Id. at 26.
145. See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S.
10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442; Agreement Concerning Frontier Watercourses, Apr. 24, 1964, Fin.-U.S.S.R., 537
U.N.T.S. 231.
146. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 18.
147. Kummer writes that the law of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes had some of its
foundations in the concept of transfrontier pollution, and that UNCLOS specifically addressed itself to
transfrontier marine pollution. Id. at 18-19.
148. Id. at 28.
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indirectly address the disposal of hazardous wastes in a
particular sphere ofthe environment. They generally establish
more detailed standards than the customary norms, and thus
contribute to the development of internationally accepted
thresholds for the different forms of pollution. 49
While these treaties are useful in this regard, they do not establish the
comprehensive approach to hazardous waste movement that is needed. °
Whether or not the rule existed in customary international law, the principle
that states have a responsibility to prevent the illegal shipment of hazardous
wastes to other states ill-equipped to handle such shipments is now a part of the
Basel and Bamako Conventions, as I discuss in the next section. The fact that
the conventions have incorporated these norms into treaty language highlights
the crucial importance of detailed regimes such as the Basel and Bamako
Conventions. If it is more important to have a treaty or convention rather than
just a reliance on rules of CIL because of state compliance problems, then it is
even more impressive that developed and developing nations were able to work
together to develop the Basel and Bamako Conventions.
Further, simply articulating the rules of customary international law may
prove to be a useful tool.'' CIL may not be a good indicator of regular state
behavior, but it is a good tool for analyzing what states say and how they talk
about a particular issue. Thus, the articulation of certain norms forms the basis
for negotiation and discussion of treaties.5 I The Basel Convention's framework
conforms to this argument. Rules of CIL seem to be incorporated into the
treaties. Art. 4(2)(c) establishes the responsibility of generators, transporters
and importers to prevent pollution due to hazardous waste, a direct
incorporation of the CIL rule to prevent pollution. Art. 4(1)(c) requires
exporter/generator states who have not already banned the particular waste to
obtain the express written permission of importer states. This is a manifestation
of the rule of prior informed consent. Another important example of the Basel
Convention's attempt to codify custom is the requirement that the state of
export take back hazardous waste that was illegally exported as a result of
conduct on the part of the exporter/generator. This is another means of
149. Id. at 26.
150. Id. at 28.
151. Bodansky, supra note 134, at 105.
152. Id. at 119.
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incorporating the duty to prevent pollution by the strict prohibition on certain
movement of hazardous wastes.
B. International Law Has Allowed Transboundary Movement and Dumping
of Hazardous Wastes in Developing Countries
Despite the rules of customary international law that existed before the
Basel Convention, many shipments of hazardous waste still crossed
international boundaries illegally, causing significant public health risks and
environmental harms. The difficulty, as always, was with enforcement.' The
rules of customary international law permitted the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste to developing countries under limited circumstances, although
the principles of preventing "substantial harm" and the more general concepts
of cooperation, consultation, and prior information should have prevented the
majority ofcatastrophes. However, there were no well-defined liability schemes
in the existing treaties and only vague notions of fault in customary
international law. Consequently, there was little to prevent developed nations
from shipping out their hazardous waste. Thus, while international law made
certain dumping formally illegal, in practice it did not actually prevent the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste to developing countries.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration might seem to restrict the transboundary
dumping of hazardous waste. However, it did not resolve the issue ofthe rights
and obligations of the states as to movement of transboundary waste because
it did not "extend to situations where the source of pollution is transferred to an
area beyond thejurisdiction of the state of origin. That state cannot be required
to observe the duty of due diligence if it does not have jurisdiction or control
over the relevant activity."'I Therefore, not even the TrailSmelter Arbitration,
one of the pieces of law most often-cited to support the notion that
transboundary pollution is illegal, was helpful in punishing those responsible for
export dumping scandals. The tool that did the most to increase public
awareness of hazardous waste export dumping was the political embarrassment
153. The EPA is required to disclose information known to be hazardous. Under U.S. law, the U.S.
cannot be responsible for exported containers that are falsely labeled. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1994).
154. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 19.
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of being discovered and the damage publicized.' This went far in deterring
further careless illegal dumping.
1. The Basel Convention
In 1982, the Governing Council of a UN committee formed a working
group of experts to develop guidelines with regard to hazardous wastes. The
resulting document, the Cairo Guidelines, aimed to protect human health and the
environment against harmful hazardous wastes" by affirming the existing rules
of customary international law. The Cairo Guidelines mandated the start of a
working group to convene a global convention on the control of the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste with the authority to adopt and
sign the convention in early 1989.'1" This convention was later called the Basel
Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes.
The Basel Convention was considered in final draft and unanimously
adopted on March 22, 1989. One-hundred five states and the EU signed the
final act. On March 22, 1990, when the Basel Convention was closed for
signature, 53 states and the EU signed it. It entered into force on May 5,
1992.15'
a. The Basel Negotiations
The Basel negotiations were "contentious" because of the controversy
surrounding the export of waste to Third World countries.' This controversy
heavily politicized the negotiations." ° The increase in the number of states
represented at the Working Group sessions for the Basel negotiations reflects
this aspect of the negotiations:
The elaboration of the Basel Convention was seen by many
primarily as an opportunity to put a stop to illegal international
waste traffic from North to South. A substantial number of
155. Hurtado & McGregor, supra note 50, at 77.
156. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 19.
157. Id. at 40.
158. Id. at4l; Basel Covention on the Control of Transboundray Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
159. KUMMER, supra note 46, at42. Developing countries largely ignored the fact that the vast majority
of waste transported internationally is traded among the developed nations. Id.
160. Id.
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developing countries, led by member states of the OAU,
regarded the deliberations as an opportunity to demonstrate
their solidarity in refusing to tolerate the use oftheir territories
as dumping grounds for toxic wastes from the rich states of the
industrialized world. 6 1
The developed countries along with UNEP, however, took the position that
they did not want certain hazardous materials, especially recyclable wastes with
economic value, to be banned from trade. UNEP did not support a complete
ban because of the concern that a complete ban might discourage the waste
movement from a nation that had inadequate disposal facilities to a nation that
had adequate disposal facilities. Developing countries were concerned that a
failure to ban recyclable hazardous waste would result in fake recycling
schemes in which recycling is used as a mere label for exports that would
otherwise be prohibited under the [Basel] Convention. 62 Thus signatories
desperate for capital might knowingly accept hazardous waste falsely labeled
as "recyclable" even though the material inside the container was banned by the
Basel Convention.
The negotiations did not lead to a satisfactory result for either side. At the
end of the three-day conference, during the adoption ceremony of the Basel
Convention, the President of Mali and OAU chair stated that the African states
were not going to sign the convention because it was too weak and that the
OAU would have to undertake further discussion.'63 The developed nations
were not happy with the outcome of the conference, either. The Republic of
Germany, the US, UK, and Japan also deferred a decision on signing for exactly
the opposite reason."6 As of Feb. 9, 1995, 81 states and the EU had ratified
it.'65
161. Id. at 43.
162. Id. at 56.
163. Id. at45.
164. Id. The U.S. eventually signed the Basel Convention by March 22, 1990. Id.
165. Id. at 41. As of the Third Conference of the Parties in Geneva in Sept. 1995, the U.S. was still not
a party to the Convention. Since industry did not approve ofthe text of the Basel Convention, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce withdrew its support and the Clinton administration has slowed ratification efforts. Marbury,
supra note 8, at 266.
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b. General Analysis of the Basel Convention
The Convention considered the obligations of the various actors in the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste: generator (usually the same as
the exporter), carrier, and importer/disposer.
c. Obligations of the Exporter/Generator
Under the Basel Convention, the generator/exporter is required to develop
waste minimization policies. All states should consequently develop
technologies and policies that decrease the amount of waste generated."6 The
generator must also take necessary steps to prevent pollution due to hazardous
waste. 67 The exporter is required to prohibit the export of hazardous waste to
states parties that have prohibited the importation of such wastes. 68 If the
importer has not prohibited the particular hazardous waste, the exporter must
obtain the importer's express written consent.'69 The exporter must reduce
transboundary movement of hazardous waste to a minimum and must do so in
an environmentally sound way.10 Exports to a state party are not allowed if the
exporter has reason to believe that the hazardous waste will not be managed in
an environmentally sound manner.' States parties are not allowed to export
to a non-party,'72 nor to Antarctica.'73 The exporter is required to notify the
state of import and the state of transit about any proposed transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes.'74 In addition, the exporter must not export
until the states of import and transit have consented in writing.' Finally, the
state of export must take back or adequately dispose of hazardous waste that
was illegally exported as a result of conduct on the part of the exporter or
166. Basel Convention, supra note 158, art. 4 para. (2)(a). States may take into account social,
technological, and economic aspects of these measures. Id.
167. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(c).
168. Id. at art. 4, para. (1)(b).
169. Id. at art. 4 para. (1)(c).
170. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(c).
171. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(e).
172. Id. at art. 4, para. (5).
173. Id. at art. 4, para. (6).
174. Id. at art. 6, para. (1).
175. Id. at art. 6, para. (3).
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generator.76 States must also introduce appropriate legislation to punish illegal
traffic.'
C. Rights and Obligations of the State of Transit
The state of transit has the right to refuse an exporter any movement of
hazardous waste through its territories.'78 The state of transit also has the same
obligations to reduce hazardous waste production'79 and to prevent pollution as
the exporter does, 80 as well as to prevent unauthorized persons from
transporting hazardous waste. 8' Hazardous waste must be labeled, packaged
and transported in conformity with generally accepted and recognized
international standards8 2 and must be accompanied by movement documents.8 3
D. Rights and Obligations of the State of Transport
States of import have the right to prohibit the importation of hazardous
waste, but they must notify all other parties (through the Secretariat) that they
are doing so.' Importing states must give their written consent for each
importation of hazardous waste.8 I Adequate disposal facilities are required of
the state of import."s Personnel involved in managing the hazardous waste
must ensure both pollution prevention'87 and the minimization oftransboundary
movement of hazardous wastes. 88 The importing state must prevent the
importation of hazardous waste if it has reason to believe that the wastes in
176. Id. at art 9, para. (2).
177. Id. at art. 9, para. (5).
178. Id. at art. 6, para. (4).
179. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(a).
180. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(c).
181. Id. at art. 4, para. 7(a).
182. Id. at art. 4, para. 7(b).
183. Id. at art. 4, para. 7(c).
184. Id. at art. 4, para. (1)(a).
185. Id. at art. 4, para. (1)(c); Id. at art. 6, para (2).
186. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(b). The Basel Convention does not provide guidance to the manner or extent
to which the exporting state must verify safety. Sometimes the only information on which the exporting country
can rely is that provided by the importing state. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 57.
187. Basel Convention, supra note 158, at art. 4, para. (2)(c).
188. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(d).
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question will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner. 89 Non-
parties are prohibited from importing hazardous waste." Only authorized
persons are permitted to dispose of waste. '9 The waste must be accompanied
by the proper paperwork and must be properly labeled, packaged and
transported. 92 Importation is only allowed if the state of export does not have
the proper facilities to properly dispose of the waste, or if the importing state
needs the hazardous waste for recycling or recovery industries."3 Finally, the
state of import must ensure proper disposal of hazardous waste if it was
illegally imported as a result of conduct by the importer or disposer.'"
As I argued earlier, the Basel Convention is valuable because it represents
the codification of the rules of CIL that had already been articulated. The Basel
Convention is "to date the most advanced attempt at comprehensive global
regulation" of hazardous waste control and is potentially the framework upon
which a comprehensive regime for transboundary movement of hazardous waste
can be realized. 9  The other treaties that regulated and prohibited
transboundary pollution (UNCLOS and the various treaties that regulated
transboundary pollution) were inadequate as comprehensive regulatory
frameworks but play complementary roles to the Basel Convention. " Thus, the
Basel Convention is an evolving regime that will hopefully improve as the
Conferences to the Parties have more time to work together.
b. Position of African States
Traditionally, the developing nations have been more concerned about
development issues than conservation issues. The governments argued that they
were too poor to worry about the environment,"9 yet they did not want groups
189. Id. at art. 4, para. (2)(g).
190. Id. at art. 4, para. (5).
191. Id. at art. 4, para. (7)(a).
192. Id. at art. 4, para. (7)(b)-(c).
193. Id. at art. 4, para. (9)(a)-(b).
194. Id. at art. 9, para. (3).
195. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 29.
196. Id.
197. See Mpanya, supra note 9, at 209.
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in their countries to protest, lest controversy discourage foreign investors. 9
Developing countries said that they were more concerned with feeding and
housing their people than they were with environmental regulations.'
Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton argue that there is an increased
acceptance by Third World countries for world cooperation in the enactment of
environmental regulations:
First, the frequent link between deterioration of the
environment and poverty and its consequences has become
obvious.... Second, the natural resources of poor countries
risk bearing the cost of unregulated development. Third,
health and nutrition of Third World people depend on the
integrity and productivity of the environment and the
compatibility of the development process with the imperatives
of conservation . . . . Fourth, Third World countries
increasingly have realized the dangers of the "exportation of
pollution" by companies or individuals seeking to profit from
weakness of protective legislation or enforcement mechanisms
in developing countries.2"
Developed nations have usually been more concerned with conservation
than with development. Because they have more clout and more power,
developed nations naturally have more ability to influence agendas and
negotiations for treaties at international conventions. Thus, treaties have been
negotiated with only the developed nations' problems in mind, thereby reflecting
"a myopic world view in which part of humanity has impunity to consider
remedying certain future problems of mankind (on their own terms) while
rejecting the realities of the present in which a substantial part of humanity has
no future prospects." ''
198. Id.
199. Shearer, International Law Colloquium, supra note 95, at 397-98.
200. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 50.
201. Shearer, International Law Colloquium, supra note 95, at 425-26. Because treaties are often
heavily influenced by developed nations, the developing nations are sometimes forced into a defensive position
which requires them to oppose an agreement which could ultimately be beneficial to themselves and the global
community. The First World is often responsible for these environmental hazards in the first place. Developed
nations have achieved their superiority in part through the exploitation of developing nations. Shearer argues
that these countries never received benefits equal to those extracted. Id. at 412. Thus, it is unfair for the Third
World to pay for externalities that the First World forces on them at the expense of their own development.
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The Organization of African Unity consolidated its position and demanded
the incorporation of strong safeguards against hazardous waste traffic from
developed to developing countries. The OAU nations refused to sign the Basel
Convention and three months later, in June 1989, the OAU Ministerial meeting
in Kampala assessed environmental problems affecting the African region in
which the OAU developed a common strategy for environmental management
and sustainable development.' ° The resulting document was the Kampala
Declaration which identified several priority areas for achieving
environmentally sound sustainable development."0 3 Shortly thereafter, the
African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) signed the Lom6 IV Convention 4
with the European Economic Community. The treaty banned exports from
developed nations to ACP nations.215 It also contained a chapter specifically on
protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources."°4 In
addition, the Lom6 IV Convention contains language that dumping nuclear and
industrial wastes in Africa is a crime against Africa and its people; it condemns
all transnational corporations involved in such activities; and it demands that
they clean up areas that have already been contaminated.0 7
Thus, negotiations for the Bamako Convention were held concurrently with
negotiations for the Basel Convention. Mpanya argues that the lack of
knowledge of how to deal with hazardous waste was responsible for reducing
levels of confidence of African governments, and that African countries started
to doubt their own abilities to dispose of hazardous waste. The OAU asked for
a complete ban on toxic waste trading to eliminate even the mere risk of dealing
202. Id. at 52. A new reading of international environmental law is that each nation has the potential to
be a trustee, executor, or guardian of the global commons. Id. at 19(emphasis added). The Brundtland
Commission, established by the U.N. in 1983, concluded that without the equitable sharing of costs and benefits
of environmental protection within and between countries, neither social justice nor sustainable development
(development that meets the needs of present and future objectives for the environment and development) can
be achieved. Id. at 51-52.
203. Id. at 52.
204. African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic community: Final Act, Minutes, and
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990). The Lomd IV Convention
interacts with the Basel Convention and is considered a supplement to it. KUMMER, supra note 46, at I I 1-12.
205. Marbury, supra note 8, at 267. The rest of the treaty would take effect only after it was ratified by
the parliaments of all 12 EEC states and 2/3 of the ACP states. KUMMER, supra note 46 at 107-08.
206. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 108.
207. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 106, at 325-26.
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with hazardous waste. ' In his Comment, Marbury argues that the OAU
interpreted the lack of a complete ban as an indication that the Basel Convention
failed to adequately protect Africa, since there was no effective system for the
administration of the Basel Convention.2' Thus, the OAU drafted the Bamako
Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamako
Convention) in protest against the Basel Convention."' This, in itself, illustrates
the ability of the OAU to use the power of its constituency to make its voice
heard, especially given that it is a voice of a variety of developed nations with
a variety of interests. With the Lom6 IV and the Bamako Conventions, the
international community saw the Third World countries band together in protest
against "garbage imperialism" by the developed nations.
3. Analysis of the Bamako Convention and Comparison with the
Basel Convention
The Bamako Convention completely bans the importation of all hazardous
waste into Africa from non-OAU nations.2 ' The definition of "hazardous
waste" in the Bamako Convention is much broader than that of the Basel
Convention. Unlike the Basel Convention, the Bamako Convention prohibits
hazardous waste imports "for any reason."21  Bamako includes waste for
recycling in its definition of hazardous waste. Katharina Kummer argues that
this language emphasizes the lack of distinction between recyclable and non-
recyclable wastes." 3 Recycling was an issue because much of the material
destined for recycling was also hazardous or toxic. Household wastes are also
included in hazardous waste2"4, which eliminates the need for a special category
of waste."' 5 Bamako also creates a limited ban on the transfer of hazardous
waste among African nations by allowing each state to designate other wastes
208. Mpanya, supra note 9, at 209.
209. Marbury, supra note 8, at 269.
210. See KUMMER, supra note 46, at 99.
211. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 4, para.. (1).
212. Id.
213. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 101.
214. Bamako Convention, supra note 100, at art. 2, para.. (1)(a).
215. C. Russell H. Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on
Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 141,155 (1993).
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as hazardous through the operation of its own domestic regulatory
procedures.1 6
The disagreement over the Basel Convention's definition of "hazardous
waste" was one of the controversies that prevented the OAU nations from
signing the original draft. The definition in the Basel Convention was criticized
chiefly because it was too broad and contained no minimum concentration
values for any particular hazardous substances." 7 A working group is currently
mandated to formulate a definition. The Basel Convention definition excludes
"household wastes", "[w]astes collected from households" and "[r]esidues
arising from incineration of household wastes." ' The Bamako Convention
includes household wastes, defined as "wastes collected from households,"2 9
including sewage and sewage sludges, as well as "residues arising from
incineration of household wastes."220 The definition of "hazardous wastes" is
still a source of contention for the Parties to the Basel Convention.
The Bamako Convention contains a liability scheme that imposes unlimited
joint and several liability on generators of improperly disposed hazardous
wastes.' Unlimited liability does not restrict the reward to damaged parties. 2
It also allows for the trier of fact to impose appropriate compensatory and
punitive damages. 3 This liability scheme is not found in the Basel Convention
because of the conflicting interests between the developed and developing
nations. 4 The Basel Convention contains no liability scheme at this point;
216. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 2, para. 1(b).
217. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 50.
218. Basel Convention, supra note 158, at Annex 11 (Y46-Y47).
219. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at Annex I (Y46).
220. Id. at Annex I (Y47).
221. Id. at art. 4, para. (3)(b); "Joint and several liability allows the trier of fact to either impose liability
upon all those responsible on a pro rata basis reflecting responsibility, or impose total liability upon one of the
responsible parties, leaving that party to obtain compensation from the other responsible parties." Shearer,
Comparative Analysis, supra note 215, at 158.
222. Shearer, Comparative Analysis, supra note 215, at 158.
223. Id.
224. The developed nations were reluctant to sign on to treaty provisions that may bind them to uncertain
and expensive assistance programs. The developing countries, on the other hand, saw such inaction as a sign
that developed countries had no real commitment to curbing waste exports. See William N. Doyle, Comment,
UnitedStates Implementation of the Basel Convention: Time Keeps Ticking, Ticking Away ... , 9 TEMP. INT'L
& CoMP. L.J. 141, 146 (1995).
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providing only that a working group meet to draft a liability scheme.ns In
addition, both Conventions provide that national legislation should be passed to
punish illegal traffic and to make the facilitation of illegal traffic a criminal
offense. 6
Critics of both conventions predict compliance problems because no
organizations currently exist to monitor compliance, to enforce the provisions,
or to prosecute violators.227 Any disputes may be settled through arbitration, or
they may be brought to the International Court of Justice, but only if both
parties consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 8
The Bamako Convention differs from the Basel Convention in other ways.
Article 4 of the Bamako Convention prohibited dumping at sea or internal
waters."9 The Basel Convention did not include this prohibition because it
recognizes that certain sectors are already regulated by other legal
instruments."'
Article 5 of the Bamako Convention creates a "Dumpwatch."23 Article 5
also created a "focal point" to centralize each member states' administration of
the treaty.232 Basel lacks any additional monitoring system such as a
"Dumpwatch." Although both conventions mandate a secretariat for monitoring
and compliance purposes, the Basel Convention is criticized for not granting
more supervisory functions to the Secretariat. 33 In Bamako, the Secretariat is
required to carry out hazardous waste audits based on information submitted to
it by the parties.234 The Bamako Secretariat also has the competence to actively
verify alleged breaches of the Convention reported to it by a party.25
225. Basel Convention, supra note 158, at art. 12.
226. Basel Convention, supra note 158, at art. 9, para. (5); Id. at art. 4, para. (3); Bamako Convention,
supra note 98, at art. 9, para. (2).
227. See Jaffe, supra note 41, at 137.
228. Id. at 135.
229. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 4, para. (2).
230. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 84.
231. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 5, para. (4).
232. Marbury, supra note 8, at 271.
233. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 82.
234. Id. at 103.
235. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 19.
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The standard regarding an environmental policy approach in Bamako is
higher than that in Basel. Bamako requires a "preventative, precautionary
approach to pollution problems, ' ' 6 and rejects Basel's less stringent
"permissible emissions." The Basel Convention requires hazardous waste
generation levels to be reduced in light of sociological, technological and
economic factors." In effect, this greatly lowers the standard for States-
Parties.
Bamako's Art. 9 provision is stronger than that of Basel. Art. 9 provides
that wastes deemed to be illegal should be returned to the state of origin in every
case."' It also places a stronger emphasis on states' duties to adopt relevant
criminal legislation."
The scope of the Bamako Convention and its high standards would have the
effect of chilling foreign business interests in Africa. Thus, it is hard to believe
that African countries, so direly in need of foreign investment and business,
would be willing to regulate hazardous waste at the expense of development.
Yet it seems that this was the choice that the OAU nations made. The memory
of horrible events in their past convinced African governments to give the
environment higher priority vis-i-vis development issues. They also felt the
impact of poor environmental health of a nation feeds directly into the expense
of having to take care of the population and the quality of work performed by
the citizenry.
The Bamako Convention is in line with the Basel Convention's fundamental
principles.24 The Basel Convention allows for regional agreements, 24' and the
Bamako Convention fulfills the requirements for a regional agreement, although
it has never been formally designated as such.242
236. Id. at art. 4, para. 3(f).
237. Marbury, supra note 8, at 272.
238. Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at art. 9, para. (3).
239. Id. at art. 9, para. (2), KUMMER, supra note 46, at 103.
240. Art. I I of the Basel Convention allows for other agreements more tailored to the specific needs of
a particular region. UNEP takes this position and even provided assistance to the OAU in drafting the Bamako
Convention. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 104-05.
241. See Basel Convention, supra note 158, at art. 2, para. 20 ("'Political and/or economic integration
organization' means an organization constituted by sovereign States to which its member States have transferred
competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention.").
242. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 105.
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4. Decision II/12
The Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention continued to meet
after the adoption of the Convention in 1989. One of the most important
decisions to be made was whether to change from a"limited ban" on hazardous
waste shipments to the "complete ban" that the African countries wanted. At
the Second Meeting in Geneva in March 1992, the Parties adopted an
amendment (Decision 11/12) that would completely prohibit the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste from OECD to non-OECD nations. Decision
11/12 would also change the definition of "hazardous wastes" to include
recyclable materials previously not included in the scope of the Convention.
Both these issues had been in great controversy during the Basel negotiations.
At the Third Meeting of the Parties in Geneva in September 1995, the
Nordic States made a motion to fully adopt the Basel Convention to reflect the
provisions of Decision 11/12.243 The Parties did so, and amended the Convention
to include the text of the decision. Seventy-six Member States agreed to a total
ban on hazardous waste exports from OECD to non-OECD nations.
Decision 11/12 also prohibited the movement ofrecyclable materials starting
on December 31, 1997.21" Although this decision was not a formal amendment
to the Basel Convention and thus, not legally binding, the Nordic States made
a formal proposal in March 1995 meeting to make Decision 11/12 binding to the
States Parties. The G-77 countries and OAU members had lobbied in favor of
a complete ban from the time of the First Conference of the Parties in Uruguay,
and finally succeeded in getting it.245 By the time of the Third Conference of the
Parties held in Geneva in September 1995, Decision 11/12 was adopted. The
negotiations for the amendment were difficult, but the overarching goal was the
protection of the environment, according to President of the Third Conference
of the Parties, Bakary Kante.246 This amendment is viewed as protecting of the
developing countries since they do not have the technical, financial, legal, and
institutional capacity for preventing illegal imports.
243. Id. at 47.
244. Id.
245. See Id. at 63.
246. Basel Convention Adopts Amendment Banning Hazardous Waste Exports From Developed to
Developing Countries, (Sept. 22, 1995)< http://www.unep.ch/sbc/pr9-95a.html>. Bakary Kante is Director
of Environment in Senegal's Ministry of Environment.
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B. Implications of the Conventions for International Environmental
Racism
The existence of the Basel and the Bamako Conventions weaken charges of
environmental racism on the international level. Two of the four characteristics
transferred from the domestic context seem to have counterparts on the
international level regarding the transboundary movement of hazardous waste:
cheap land and poverty. The other two characteristics concerning the inability
of domestic minority communities to mobilize (lack of political power and lack
of mobility) do not apply to the international situation. The OAU nations were
able to unite to present a unified position on hazardous waste movement to the
Meeting of the Parties to the Basel Convention, and to draft and enact their own
conventions to completely ban the import of hazardous wastes into Africa.
International environmental racism is a phrase that does not apply to the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Even if the lack of liability
schemes makes enforcement of the Conventions difficult, at least the
instruments that currently exist are a strong start in the control of international
shipments of hazardous waste.247
Another tool of international law that weakens claims of international
environmental racism is national sovereignty. Sovereignty protects a nation's
right to undertake environmental protections or risks. The theoretical right of
nations to refuse shipments of hazardous wastes and other rules of customary
international law, as well as the existence of the Basel and Bamamko
Conventions attest to the ability of even the least powerful nations to control the
amount of pollution by hazardous waste.
247. A few incidents of the movement of hazardous waste in African countries have been reported. An
example of the movement of hazardous waste is a ship carrying toxic chemicals which left Mombasa Harbor
looking for a home for its cargo. Robert Bisset, Mombasa Toxic Chemicals Incident (April1996)
<http://www.ee/lists/infoterra/1996/04/0014.html. Some argue that"the [Basel] Convention's formation has
not prevented an increase in dumping, . .. and [t]he organization cited what it called a 'new epidemic of
industrialized nations dumping toxic waste on the economically struggling nations of the Third World and
Eastern and Central Europe." Environment: Fears Expressed About Third World Becoming Waste Dump,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Several incidents
were also reported after 1992. See LouKA, supra note 91, at 106-08.
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Ironically, there is no equivalent right in the United States. There is a long
tradition of freedom of movement of hazardous waste across state lines that has
been strongly protected by dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 4 , The
lack of sovereignty has prevented communities of color in the U.S. from
banning the import of hazardous waste into their communities. Nations have
more and better protection through the concept of sovereignty than do
communities of color in the United States. Perhaps if these communities of
color could identify some right, such as the notion of a right to a clean
environment, they would have more control over what kinds of pollutants enter
their communities. They could choose to accept these wastes, but would have
to give their express permission. Instead, communities of color must rely on
awkward and slow-moving Congressional action (or inaction) and often
unpredictable Supreme Court jurisprudence.249
Finally, the Basel Convention highlights the issue of compliance despite a
lack of enforcement schemes. The existence of the Basel and Bamako
Conventions make it difficult to assert international environmental racism.
Even if CIL previous to the drafting of the Basel Convention was extremely
weak or non-existent, thus making claims of international environmental racism
more legitimate, the advent of the Basel Convention eclipsed the claim of
racism. Once a treaty is in place and states become parties and ratify the
convention, there is strong incentive to comply with the treaty, as I argue below.
Compliance with the treaty means, to a large degree, a prohibition on hazardous
waste movement into developing countries. If there is no movement of waste
into these countries, there can be no claims of environmental racism.
The Bamako Convention's liability scheme, which imposes strict liability,
is even more effective against further illegal dumping. The existence of the
Bamako Convention shows that developing nations are not being forced to
remain ignorant, nor are they burying their heads in the sand about issues of
environmental concern.
248. Kate Sinding, Comment, The Transboundary Movement of Waste: A Critical Comparison of US.
Interstate Policy and the Emerging International Regime, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 796,823 (1996).
249. Sinding suggests that "Congress should enact comprehensive national legislation governing the
interstate transportation of hazardous waste rather than depending on the Supreme Court to rethink its
jurisprudence in the area, or relying on legislative proposals which grant states the individual ability to
regulate." Id. at 828.
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The existence or non-existence of enforcement schemes are a constant
concern in international agreements. Legal regimes contained the Bamako
Convention and in the Basel Convention (whenever they are finally drafted)
impose compliance in certain ways that are not concrete. Thus, the fact that a
liability scheme and enforcement body have not yet been drafted in the Basel
Convention does not mean that states will not comply with the Convention.
Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury comment that despite a lack of
concreteness, there are three ways in which legal regimes provide incentives to
comply. First, "states generally comply with international obligations...
because of their broader concern with their reputation as reliable partners and
their long-term interest in a rule-governed.., international system."25 They
further argue that regimes "stabilize expectations and institutionalize the fact
that states are involved in long-term co-operation and in negotiating over an
increasingly wide range of issues" ' Thus, they have more of an interest in
"predictability provided by rules and the salience of reputation""2 ' because of
this interdependence of issues. A third way in which environmental regimes
encourage compliance is that they "contribute to a greater degree of
transparency" '253 which: (1) "undercuts the 'realist' position that anarchy
inevitably generates mistrust and forces states to base policy on worst-case
assumptions";2" and (2) "leads to ... states coming to be more aware of the
dangers of environmental degradation and the costs of non-agreement.""2 Even
though enforcement is a constant concern in international law, commentators
have long recognized that expectations and predictability of actions of nations
are often very strong incentives as much as legal, and more concrete, notions of
enforcement in the form of a lawsuit holding individuals accountable or a
supranational court or body to whom disputes can be taken.
250. Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment: An
Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 24 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 1992).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 25.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. Implications of the Conventions
Undeniably, before a liability scheme and enforcement mechanisms are
added, the direct and immediate result ofthe Bamako and Basel Conventions is
that businesses in developed countries are now targeting Latin America and the
Caribbean for dumping.256 Asia and the Middle East will also be future targets
for the hazardous waste trade. The Asian countries have not yet drafted an
agreement similar to that of Bamako although many of the newly industrialized
Asian countries have signed on to the Basel Convention.
The development mind-set of the Asian countries, especially the "Four
Tigers," is so strong that it seems unlikely that they will ever go beyond the
provisions of the Basel Convention in order to regulate hazardous waste trade.
Perhaps they see the Basel Convention as strong enough to prevent major
environmental disasters. Asian nations seem to be less concerned with the
environment than the OAU nations. They seem willing to sacrifice more than
the African countries in order to catch the interest of First World corporations.
In fact, we can already see this happening. Trade liberalization in Asia leads
to massive industrial development, which leads to a corresponding increase in
pollution and the generation of large amounts of wastes.2" One estimate is that
1.9 million tons of hazardous waste was generated in 1990 in Thailand, and that
the amount will be four times greater by 2001.258
B. Sovereignty in Light of the Conventions
Hurrell and Kingsbury argue that "the development of international
environmental law has reduced the autonomy (although, apart from the EC, not
the legal capacity or 'sovereignty') of states and provided for the international
256. Corporations present their waste to countries like Colombia as development plans that promise
employment, electricity, and social and technological progress. See Alston & Brown, supra note 72, at 185.
257. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 11.
258. Id.
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regulation of an increasing range of domestic environmental activities." ' 9 Due
to the activity of OAU nations, developed nations are no longer free to export
hazardous waste to developing nations at a drastically lower cost. The OAU
nations seemed to find unity and strength in their identity as African nations.
Thus, they willingly subordinated sovereignty concerns when they successfully
lobbied for the two conventions, and were able to unite under the umbrella of
"Africa." Through this vehicle of regional and, perhaps ironically, racial
identity, these desperately financially and politically-poor countries were able
to completely ban the import of hazardous waste and recyclables from
developed nations.
Sovereignty is usually seen as a barrier to unity and a hindrance to
solidarity. In this case, however, sovereignty seemed not to be an issue. Both
conventions state in the first part of their preambles that the Parties are aware
of the potential for damage to human health and the environment.2" It is this
belief in the importance of the environment that provided African countries with
the strength and solidarity to ban hazardous wastes.
The very existence ofthe Basel Convention makes a belief in racist attitudes
seem cynical, even though the Bamako Convention did serve as an effective
"protest" tool. The practice of environmental racism, even if it did once exist,
is much more difficult to practice now, in the arena of the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste. The environment is simply too important and
its damages too far-reaching for countries to continue to think about the
environment in terms of racism.
However, sovereignty issues continue to concern all nations and remain a
factor in environmental politics. For example, the United States' failure to ratify
the Basel Convention might be explained by the sovereignty argument.
International industry, including the American Chemical Manufacturer's
Association, strongly disapproved of the total ban on hazardous wastes. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce repealed its support of the Basel Convention.
Thus, the Clinton Administration drastically slowed efforts to become a party
to the Convention, despite promises to do so. If large industry in the U.S.
disapproved of the Basel Convention, and industry and the government are
closely allied, then the government could justifiably invoke sovereignty to resist
becoming a party to a treaty in order to protect its business interests.
259. Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra note 250, at 44- 45.
260. Basel Convention, supra note 158, at pmbl., para. 1; Bamako Convention, supra note 98, at pmbl.,
para. 1.
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Sovereignty issues are a concern in other aspects of the Basel Convention
as well. Kummer argues that Principle 21 is not easy to apply vis-a-vis
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes because it does not apply to
situations where the source of pollution is mobile and can be transferred to
areas beyond the jurisdiction of the state of origin. "[A] state cannot be
required to exercise due diligence if it does not havejurisdiction or control over
the relevant activity."26 And certainly, a state no longer has control over an
activity once it is inside another country's borders. This raises sovereignty
issues. How can a nation be responsible for hazardous waste and its harmful
effects once it is received by the state of destination?262
Sovereignty arguments are eclipsed by the OAU's effort to reduce
hazardous waste movement into Africa and its emphasis on shipping waste to
countries that know how to properly dispose of it. On the international level,
the actions of the Third World really exemplify increased emphasis of
safeguarding the environment.
C. Implications for International Relations and International Law
I first demonstrated how the four characteristics of environmental racism:
cheap land, lack of mobility, lack of political clout, and poverty are found in
domestic claims of environmental racism. Then, turning to the international
level, I applied the domestic characteristics of environmental racism to the
international situation. I found that, due to the existence of the Basel and
Bamako Conventions, two of the characteristics (lack of political clout and lack
of mobility) did not apply on the international level. Looking at the pre-Basel
customary international law, I argued that rules of customary international law,
although seemingly well-developed, did not necessarily accurately characterize
international norms of behavior. The rules of custom may not have reflected
actual behavior, but did reflect the articulation of certain norms, and perhaps
what states ideally thought about hazardous waste movement. This discussion
or articulation formed the framework for the Basel negotiations. Although some
might argue that even with the Basel and Bamako Conventions in place, illegal
movement of hazardous waste continues to occur, I argue that this criticism
downplays the importance of a more comprehensive regulatory regime than has
been seen before Basel.
261. KUMMER, supra note 46, at 19.
262. See id. at 15-16.
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Once a treaty codifies customary international law, it becomes enforceable
against states. The rather detailed nature of the Basel and Bamako Conventions
allows states to better articulate their rights in international law, and allows
them to keep each other in check, for the threat of international embarrassment
regarding an illegal shipment of hazardous waste is given more bite with a
treaty in place. I mentioned some of the other ways in which the existence of
a legal regime keeps states in compliance despite the lack of international
tribunals and courts to enforce treaties.
A brief summary of the Basel and Bamako Conventions and their more
notable features helped emphasize that both were more comprehensive regimes
than anything that has existed before Basel. It also recognized that the Basel
Convention was more thanjust a symbolic attempt to regulate hazardous waste,
despite criticisms that it only reiterated already established policies of the U.S.
and the EC. The discussion of the Basel Convention was meant to highlight the
obligations and rights of generators/states of export, transporters, and states of
import. Furthermore, the fact that the Bamako Convention was heavily
influenced and modeled on the Basel Convention points out that the Basel
Convention covered certain areas very thoroughly. Because the Basel
Convention was drafted first (and with the help of UNEP), the OAU nations
were able to confidently draft an even tighter scheme for the regulation of
hazardous waste movement.
Claims of international environmental racism are difficult to explain, given
the existence of some rather comprehensive conventions. Although international
environmental racism may have led to the illegal dumping of toxic wastes in
developing nations, it became much more difficult to continue to dump, and
more difficult to assert that international environmental racism exists, once the
Basel, Bamako, and Lom6 IV Conventions were ratified. The ability of the
developing nations to put their concerns on the international agenda, in addition
to the realization by developed nations that hazardous waste movement was a
global issue that affected more than just importer states, led to the drafting of
more comprehensive regulatory regimes than had previously existed. These
arguments pull at least one leg out from under the critics of transboundary
movement of hazardous waste.
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One final issue that is beyond the scope of this paper is that of a more
detailed analysis of relations between developed and developing nations,
especially colonists and former colonies. The examination of this relationship
might reveal some deeper issues about racism and the exploitation of poorer
nations, as well as the issue of fairness and justice in dealings between
developed and developing states.26
Finally, the arguments I have made throughout this paper give more
credence to the argument that in recent times, state sovereignty has a different
role to play in the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. All nations
are concerned enough to ban hazardous wastes into Africa which indicates a
shift in international environmental notions of protecting only that which is
inside one's own national boundaries. That is, the African countries of the
OAU acted together and subordinated state sovereignty in order to speak with
one voice to the developed nations. This is unusual because:
the nation state remains extremely resilient as a focus for
human loyalties and as a structure for the exercise of political
power. There is little or no consensus amongst the leaders of
states or amongst populations that a move towards
supranationalism is desirable. This is particularly true of the
developing world. For many peoples of the post-colonial
world, the achievement of statehood was the condition of
political emancipation.2"
Furthermore, the power that developing nations have is usually described
as "negative." This means that they only have the power to undermine
263. Shue's notions of various kinds of injustices would help in this analysis. Henry Shue, The
Unavoidability of Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL PoLmcs OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AcTORs, INTERESTS, AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 250, at 373. The first type of injustice assumes that the amount of resources that any
country has is the amount that it should or ought to have. See id. at 385-86. Shue would argue instead that
"the existing intentional distributions of wealth and resources are morally arbitrary at best and the result of
systematic exploitation at worst." Id. at 386. "Background injustice" recognizes that poor nations might agree
to something not knowing enough to know that the agreement actually disadvantages them. Id. at 386-87.
Another type of injustice is that developed nations are primarily responsible for the production of hazardous
wastes, so they should acknowledge that they have a greater responsibility to control the wastes. Developed
countries continue to benefit far more than the developing countries from the production of hazardous wastes.
The third type of injustice takes account of the cost of ignoring the costs of coping - small problems in poor
nations are big problems because these nations lack the technology and know-how to deal with problems that
wealthier nations would consider small. See id. at 393.
264. Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra note 250, at 7.
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international environmental agreements. The ban, however, is an example of
a "positive" power. Although the inability of developing nations to properly
dispose of waste can potentially be a serious issue for developed nations,
generally, the damage of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is
isolatable within national boundaries. The unity of African countries, however,
in their push for a change in the Basel Convention, was not just an attempt to
undermine the control of hazardous waste shipments. It was a further
restriction on the movement of dangerous chemicals that was arguably a move
toward self-preservation.
It is easier to ban hazardous wastes because the issue is fundamentally
different from those contemplated by Principle 21. In this case, it is not difficult
to bar smelly, dangerous hazardous chemicals created by developed nations.
This hazardous waste is shipped into a country, much in the same way as
bacteria is introduced into the body. Once it is brought in, proper methods have
to be used in order to properly control the waste, or else it can quite literally
lead to infection and pain. This is not to say that the nations do not sometimes
voluntarily take in the waste, but they often are unaware of the potential harm
of the waste, given that they do not have the proper technology and
infrastructure.
Some commentators have seen the increasing concern for the environment
as necessitating a change in conceptions of sovereignty, even if states are
unwilling to "abandon theoretical notions of sovereignty... in favor of the
amorphous demands of future generations or allegedly vested environmental
rights of an indeterminate and limitless character.""26 One commentator
remarked ". . . the sovereignty doctrine is still alive but ... it no longer
manifests itself in the shape of an albatross; its wings have been clipped by a
growing number of widely accepted regulations... based on adaptation of old
and new principles that are now widely regarded as being indispensable to
preservation of life on our planet.... A creature of a new shape is emerging
perhaps best renamed, in the context of these wider environmental
developments, as 'responsible' . . . sovereignty." '
If we accept that this new "responsible sovereignty" is a reality, then the
assertion that international environmental racism exists is becoming outmoded
in favor of a globalized conception of the transboundary movement of
265. Patricia Birnie, International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs,
in THE INTERNATIONAL POLmCS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 250, at 84.
266. Id.
[Vol. 5:659
1998] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 709
hazardous waste. This new conceptualization and the treaties will hopefully
encourage technology-sharing with developing states, in addition to the
cessation of all hazardous waste shipments into countries who are signatories.

